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ABSTRACT
The POSSIBLE WINNER (PW) problem, a fundamental algorithmic problem in computational social
choice, concerns elections where voters express only partial preferences between candidates. Via
a sequence of investigations, a complete classification of the complexity of the PW problem was
established for all pure positional scoring rules: the PW problem is in P for the plurality and veto
rules, and NP-complete for all other such rules. More recently, the PW problem was studied on
classes of restricted partial orders that arise in natural settings, such as partitioned partial orders and
truncated partial orders; in particular, it was shown that there are rules for which the PW problem
drops from NP-complete to P on such restricted partial orders. Here, we investigate the PW problem
on partial chains, i.e., partial orders that are a total order on a subset of their domains. Such orders
arise naturally in a variety of settings, including rankings of movies or restaurants. We classify
the complexity of the PW problem on partial chains by establishing that, perhaps surprisingly, this
restriction does not change the complexity of the problem, namely, the PW problem is NP-complete
for all pure positional scoring rules other than the plurality and veto rules. As a byproduct, we obtain
a new and more principled proof of the complexity of the PW problem on arbitrary partial orders.
1 Introduction
Determining the winners in an election under various voting rules has been a mainstream topic of research in computa-
tional social choice. Ideally, each voter has a clear ranking among the candidates, from the most preferred one to the
least preferred one. In reality, however, a voter may have only limited information about the candidates, which translates
to the voter providing only a partial order among the candidates that reflects the voter’s incomplete preferences (see the
survey [1]). This state of affairs motivated [2] to introduce the notion of possible winners and necessary winners, where
a candidate is a possible (necessary) winner if the candidate is a winner in at least one (respectively, in all) sets of linear
orders that extend the set of partial orders provided by the voters.
There has been an extensive study of the complexity of the associated decision problems POSSIBLE WINNER (PW) and
NECESSARY WINNER (NW) with respect to a variety of voting rules. Through a series of investigations [2, 3, 4, 5], the
complexity of these problems has been classified for all pure positional scoring rules (see Section 2 for the precise
definitions). Specifically, NW is in P w.r.t. every pure positional scoring rule (where P is the class of all decision
problems solvable in polynomial time), while PW is in P w.r.t. the plurality rule and the veto rule, but it is NP-complete
w.r.t. all other such rules.
More recently, the PW problem was studied on classes of restricted partial orders that arise in natural settings. For
example, the preferences of the voters may be provided as top-truncated partial orders, that is, partial orders in which
each voter linearly orders some top candidates, but expresses no preference on the rest. At the other end, we may
have bottom-truncated partial orders, where each voter linearly orders some bottom candidates (i.e., “anybody but"
candidates), but expresses no preference on the rest. We may also have doubly-truncated partial orders, where each
voter linearly orders some top and bottom candidates, but expresses no preference for the ones in the middle. In [6, 7, 8],
the complexity of the PW problem on such truncated partial orders was investigated. While no complete classification
was obtained, it was shown that there are pure positional scoring rules, such as the 2-approval rule, for which the
complexity of PW drops from NP-complete to P on doubly-truncated partial orders.
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A partial order is partitioned if its elements can be partitioned into disjoint sets with a linear order between the disjoint
sets, but no preference between elements in each set. In the machine learning community, such partial orders were
shown to be common in many real-life datasets; furthermore, they have been used for learning statistical models
on full and partial rankings [9, 10, 11]. Clearly, doubly-truncated partial orders are a special case of partitioned
partial orders. In [12], the complexity of the PW problem on partitioned partial orders was investigated and a nearly
complete classification was obtained for positional scoring rules. In particular, it was shown that, for all 2-valued rules
(which contain 2-approval as a special case) and also for the rule with scoring vectors of the form (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), the
complexity of PW on partitioned partial orders drops from NP-complete to P.
Summary of results In this paper, we investigate the PW problem on partial chains, i.e., partial orders that are a total
order on a subset of their domains. Such orders arise naturally in elections in which the number of candidates is large
and, as a result, each voter can rank only a subset of the candidates. For example, consider the movies released in 2019.
Most viewers have seen only a subset of these movies and so they can only rank the movies they have seen. A similar
state of affairs holds for songs, books, restaurants, and so on. Partial chains are the most fitting model for this type of
scenario. Indeed, it might be the case that a voter will like a movie they have not seen so far more than any of the the
movies they have already seen (or less than any of the the movies they have already seen). This state of affairs can be
modelled by partial chains, but not by partitioned, doubly-truncated, top-truncated, or bottom-truncated partial orders.
We obtain a complete classification of the complexity of the PW problem on partial chains by establishing that this
restriction does not change the complexity of the problem, namely, PW is NP-complete for all pure positional scoring
rules other than the plurality rule and the veto rule. This result should be contrasted with the aforementioned results
about the drop in complexity of PW on doubly-truncated partial orders and on partitioned partial orders. Our result also
yields a new, self-contained proof of the classification of the complexity of PW on arbitrary partial orders. Moreover,
unlike the proof of the original classification theorem, our proof uses reductions from a single NP-complete problem,
namely, the 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING problem.
Finally, we obtain new results about the complexity of the PW problem on doubly-truncated partial orders by establishing
that this problem is NP-complete for a variety of pure positional scoring rules that were not covered by the earlier work
on this problem. These rules include a broad group of both p-valued rules as well as unbounded rules.
2 Preliminaries and Earlier Work
Voting profiles A (strict) partial order on a set C is a binary relation  on C that is irreflexive (i.e., a 6 a, for every
a ∈ C) and transitive (i.e., a  b and b  c imply a  c, for all a, b, c ∈ C. A total order on C is a partial order  on
C such that for all a, b ∈ C, we have a = b or a  b or b  a.
Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of candidates and let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be a set of voters. A (complete) voting profile is
a tuple T = (T1, . . . , Tn) of total orders on elements of C, where each Tl represents the ranking (preference) of voter
vl on the candidates in C. Similarly, a partial voting profile is a tuple P = (P1, . . . , Pn) of partial orders on C, where
each Pl represents the partial preferences of voter vl on the candidates in C. A completion of a partial voting profile
P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is a complete voting profile T = (T1, . . . , Tn) such that each Tl is a completion of the partial order
Pl, i.e., Tl is a total order that extends Pl. Note that a partial voting profile may have exponentially many completions.
Voting rules We focus on positional scoring rules, a widely studied class of voting rules. A positional scoring rule r
on a set of m candidates is specified by a scoring vector s = (s1, . . . , sm) of non-negative integers, called the score
values, such that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm and s1 > sm. Suppose that T = (T1, . . . , Tn) is a total voting profile. The score
s(Tl, c) of a candidate c on Tl is the score value sk where k is the position of candidate c in Tl. The score of c under
the positional scoring rule r on the total profile T is the sum
∑n
l=1 s(Tl, c). A candidate c is a winner if c’s score is
greater than or equal to the scores of all other candidates; similarly, c is a unique winner if c’s score is greater than the
scores of all other candidates. The set of all winners is denoted by W(r,T).
We consider positional scoring rules that are defined for every number m of candidates. Thus, a positional scoring
rule is an infinite sequence s1, s2, . . . , sm, . . . of scoring vectors such that each sm is a scoring vector of length m.
Alternatively, a positional scoring rule is a function r that takes as argument a pair (m, s) of positive integers with
s ≤ m and returns as value a non-negative integer r(m, s) such that r(m, 1) ≥ r(m, 2) . . . ≥ r(m,m). We assume
that the function r is computable in time polynomial in m, hence the winners can be computed in polynomial time.
Such a rule is pure if the scoring vector sm+1 of length (m+ 1) is obtained from the scoring vector sm of length m by
inserting a score value in some position of sm, provided that the non-increasing order of score values is maintained.
For every scoring rule sm, multiplying all score values by the same value, and adding the same constant to all score
values does not change the winners; thus, we assume that the s1, . . . , sm are co-prime and that there exists a k such that
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sj = 0 for all j > k. Such a sm is called a normalised scoring vector. Note that this is not a restriction. The plurality
rule (1, 0, . . . , 0), the veto rule (1, . . . , 1, 0), the t-approval rule (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
, 0, . . . , 0) with a fixed t ≥ 2, for m > 2, and
the Borda count (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, 0) are prominent pure positional scoring rules.
Necessary and possible winners Let r be a voting rule and P a partial voting profile. The following notions were
introduced by Konczak and Lang [2].
• The set PW(r,P) of the possible winners w.r.t. r and P is the union of the sets W(r,T), where T varies over
all completions of P. Thus, a candidate c is a possible winner w.r.t. r and P, if c is in the set W(r,T) of
winners, for at least one completion T of P.
The POSSIBLE WINNER PROBLEM (PW) w.r.t. r asks: given a set of candidates C, a partial profile P, and a
distinguished candidate c ∈ C, is c ∈ PW(r,P)?
• The set NW(r,P) of the necessary winners w.r.t. r and P is the intersection of the sets W(r,T), where T
varies over all completions of P. Thus, a candidate c is a necessary winner w.r.t. r and P , if c is in the set
W(r,T) of winners, for every completion T of P.
The NECESSARY WINNER PROBLEM (NW) w.r.t. r asks: given a set of candidates C, a partial profile P, and
a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, is c ∈ NW(r,P)?
The notions of necessary unique winners and possible unique winners are defined in an analogous manner.
Through the initial investigation by [2] and subsequent investigations by [3], [4], and [5], the following classification of
the complexity of the necessary and the possible winners for all pure positional scoring rules was established.
Theorem 1. [Classification Theorem] The following hold.
• For every pure positional scoring rule r, the necessary winner problem NW w.r.t. r is in P.
• The possible winner problem PW w.r.t. the plurality rule and the veto rule is in P. For all other pure positional
scoring rules r, this problem is NP-complete.
Furthermore, the same classification holds for necessary unique winners and possible unique winners.
The proof of the above classification is rather involved; also, it is not self-contained as it spans several papers. The
proofs of NP-hardness for various positional scoring rules use reductions from several different known NP-complete
problems, including 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING, EXACT 3-COVER, HITTING SET, 3-SAT, and MULTICOLOURED
CLIQUES.
3 Complexity of PW on Partial Chains
This section contains the main result of the paper. We begin by defining the concept of a partial chain.
Definition 1. A partial order on a set C is a partial chain if it is a linear order on a non-empty subset C ′ of C.
Let C = {a, b, c, d, e} be a set of candidates. Clearly, every total order on C is a partial chain. Two other examples of
partial chains on C are a  d  c and d  a  c  b.
Definition 2. We write PW-PC to denote the restriction of the PW problem to partial chains. More precisely, the
PW-PC problem asks: given a set of candidates C, a partial profile P in which every partial order Pl, 1 ≤ l ≤ n, is a
partial chain, and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, is c ∈ PW(r,P)?
Since PW-PC is a special case of PW, Theorem 1 implies that if r is the plurality rule or the veto rule, then the
PW-PC problem with respect to r is in P. The main result of this paper asserts that these are the only tractable cases.
Theorem 2. Let r be a pure positional scoring rule other than the plurality and the veto rules. Then the PW-PC problem
with respect to r is NP-complete.
Corollary 1. [Classification Theorem for Partial Chains]
1. If r is plurality rule or the veto rule, then the PW-PC problem with respect to r is in P.
2. For all other pure positional scoring rules r, the PW-PC problem with respect to r is NP-complete.
3
3.1 Proof outline of Theorem 2
NP-complete problem used As mentioned earlier, the NP-completeness of PW for rules other than plurality and
veto in Theorem 1 was established via reductions from a variety of well known NP-complete problems. Furthermore,
none of these reductions used partial chains in the PW-instances constructed. Here, we will establish the NP-hardness
of PW-PC for rules other than plurality and veto via reductions from a single well known NP-complete problem, namely,
the 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING (3DM) Problem (Problem [SP1] in [13]). This problem asks: given three disjoint
sets X = {x1, . . . , xq}, Y = {y1, . . . , yq}, Z = {z1, . . . , zq} of the same size, and a setS ⊆ X × Y × Z , is there
a subsetS ′ ⊆ S such that |S ′| = q andS ′ does not contain two different triples that agree in at least one of their
coordinates?
Grouping of Pure Positional Scoring Rules The NP-hardness of PW with respect to rules other than plurality and
veto in Theorem 1 was established by considering either groups of rules with similar characteristics [3] or individual
rules, e.g., the rule with scoring vectors of the form (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) [5]. Here, we will establish the NP-hardness of
PW-PC with respect to rules other than plurality and veto by grouping the pure positional scoring rules into two different
groups, namely, bounded rules and unbounded rules.
Definition 3. Let r be a pure positional scoring rule.
• We say that r is p-valued, where p is a positive integer greater than 1, if there exists a positive integer n0 such
that for all m ≥ n0, the scoring vector sm of r contains exactly p distinct values.
• We say that r is bounded if r is p-valued, for some p > 1; otherwise, r is unbounded.
Clearly, the plurality rule, the veto rule, and the t-approval rule with fixed t ≥ 2, are 2-valued rules. For
a different example of a 2-valued rule, consider the rule with scoring vectors s2m = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
) and
s2m+1 = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m+1
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
), where m ≥ 1. Furthermore, the rule with scoring vectors of the form (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) is
3-valued, while the Borda count (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0) is an unbounded rule. Note also that, unlike the Borda count,
an unbounded scoring rule may have score values that are not decreasing at the same rate or may have arbitrarily long
repeating score values.
Main Steps The technical cornerstones of the proof of Theorem 2 are three polynomial-time reductions, each of
which reduces the 3DM problem to the PW-PC problem with respect to the following types of pure positional scoring
rules:
• 2-approval, which is then extended to all 2-valued rules other than plurality and veto.
• 3-valued rules, which is then extended to all p-valued rules with p > 3.
• unbounded scoring rules.
In each reduction, the partial profile we construct from an arbitrary 3DM instance consists of two parts. The first part is
a set of partial chains (which are not total orders). These encode the given instance of the 3DM problem. It is worth
pointing out that these partial chains have at most two candidates “missing". The high-level idea of the construction is
as follows. In order for candidate c to win in some completion of the partial chains, some other candidates have to lose
points. Suppose c′ is one such candidate. To lose points, c′ has to be in a higher position. Whenever c′ is in a higher
position, a few other candidates are “pushed up" to lower positions, and they gain points. The score of these candidates
are set in such a way that they can be “pushed up" only once. We set the specific scores for every candidate using the
second part of the partial profile, which consists of a total profile. These votes, which fulfil certain properties, can be
constructed in time polynomial in the number of candidates due to a result similar to the one in [14, Lemma 4.2]. A
variant of this result has been used in the literature [15, 16, 17, 18, 12]. To make our work self-contained, we state and
prove the following variant of the original result and use it in all our reductions from 3DM to PW-PC.
Lemma 1. Given a set C = {c1, . . . , cm} of candidates, a singleton D = {d}, a normalised scoring vector s of
length m + 1, and for every ci, a list of integers ηi,1, . . . , ηi,m with
m∑
j=1
|ηi,j | ≤ O(m4), one can construct, in time
polynomial in m, a total voting profileQ and a λQ ∈ N such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the score s(Q, ci) = λQ+Ri where
Ri =
m∑
j=1
ηi,j(sj − sj+1) and s(Q, d) < λQ. In particular, the number of votes in the profileQ is polynomial in m.
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Proof. Before proving the lemma, we introduce some notation which will be useful for the proof. Let, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
the value δj = sj − sj+1. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m+ 1, let β(d, j) be a block of |C| = m votes where
• in each vote in the block, d is in position j.
• in the m votes, all the candidates besides d are in each position exactly once.
For a given j, note that there are many ways to construct such a block β(d, j). Given j, we fix a block β(d, j). The
following is an example of the block β(d, 1).
d > c1 > c2 > . . . > cm−1 > cm
d > c2 > c3 > . . . > cm > c1
d > c3 > c4 > . . . > c1 > c2
...
...
...
...
...
...
d > cm > c1 > . . . > cm−2 > cm−1
When we talk about the score of a candidate in a block, we refer to the score of the candidate in a profile containing
only the votes of that block. Observe that no matter how a block is constructed, the score of all the candidates is always
the same. The score of the candidates in the block β(d, j) are as follows.
• s(β(d, j), d) = msj
• For all x ∈ C \ {d}, we have s(β(d, j), x) = −sj +
m+1∑
k=1
sk = λβ(d,j)
If candidate d in position j and candidate c is in position j + 1 are swapped, the score of c increases by δj , i.e., the
score of c is λβ(d,j) + δj . The score of d decreases and the scores of all the candidates in C \ {d, c} remain unchanged.
We will use this idea construct the total profileQ.
LetQ be an empty profile and λQ = 0. We will construct the total profileQ incrementally. For each ci ∈ C, for each
ηi,j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and ηi,j 6= 0, we add votes toQ in the following two steps.
1. This consists of two cases.
Case I. ηi,j > 0
We take the block β(d, j).
• s(β(d, j), d) = msj
• For all x ∈ C \ {d}, we have s(β(d, j), x) = λβ(d,j) = −sj +
m+1∑
k=1
sk
Consider the vote where ci is in position j + 1. By construction, in every block, such a vote exists. Swap
the positions of candidate d and ci. Let this block of votes be β+(d, j).
• s(β+(d, j), d) = msj − sj + sj+1 = msj − δj
• s(β+(d, j), ci) = λβ(d,j) − sj+1 + sj = λβ(d,j) + δj
• For all x ∈ C \ {ci, d}, we have s(β+(d, j), x) = λβ(d,j).
We add ηi,j copies of the votes in the block β+(d, j) to the profileQ. We add ηi,jλβ(d,j) to λQ.
Case II. ηi,j < 0
We take the block β(d, j + 1).
• s(β(d, j + 1), d) = msj+1
• For all x ∈ C \ {d}, we have s(β(d, j + 1), x) = λβ(d,j+1) = −sj+1 +
m+1∑
k=1
sk
Consider the vote where ci is in position j. By construction, in every block, such a vote exists. Swap the
positions of candidate d and ci. Let this block of votes be β−(d, j).
• s(β−(d, j + 1), d) = msj+1 + sj − sj+1 = msj + δj
• s(β−(d, j + 1), ci) = λβ(d,j+1) + sj+1 − sj = λβ(d,j+1) − δj
• For all x ∈ C \ {ci, d}, we have s(β−(d, j + 1), x) = λβ(d,j+1).
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We add ηi,j copies of the votes in the block β−(d, j) to the profileQ. We add ηi,jλβ(d,j+1) to λQ.
The number of votes produced in this step is ηi,jm. The time to construct these votes is bounded byO(ηi,j ,m).
2. Observe that the score of d in the block of votes obtained from either of the above cases can be more than
that of some cw ∈ C. In particular, the difference between the scores of d and cw is always strictly less than
ηi,jms1. Consider the block β(d,m+ 1).The score of d in this block is 0. The score of all the candidates in
C, including cw, in this block is λβ(d,m+1) =
(
m∑
k=1
sk
)
. To ensure that cw is never defeated by d, we add
ηi,jm copies of the votes in the block β(d,m+ 1) to the profileQ. We add ηi,jmλβ(d,m+1) to λQ.
The number of votes produced in this step is ηi,jm2. The time required to construct these votes is bounded by
O(ηi,j ,m
2).
Now we compute the upper-bound of the number of votes inQ and time taken to construct the profile. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
to set the score of candidate ci we added
(
m+m2
) m∑
j=1
ηi,j votes inQ, and thus a total of
(
m+m2
) m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
ηi,j votes.
Since for each i, we have
m∑
j=1
ηi,j ≤ O(m4), the total number of votes inQ is bounded above by a polynomial in m.
The total time required to construct these votes is also bounded above by a polynomial in m.
Let (X ,Y,Z,S ) be a 3DM instance where S = {S1, . . . St} ⊆ X × Y × Z such that Si = (xi1 , yi2 , zi3),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. In all the reductions from 3DM to PW-PC, for each ci ∈ C, the value Ri will be of the form
Ri =
m∑
k=1
lkδk +
m+1∑
k=1
hksk where
m∑
k=1
lk ≤ O(m) and each
m+1∑
k=1
hk ≤ t ≤ O(m3). Since, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, the score
value sk = (δk + . . .+ δm), and sm = 0, we have that Ri =
m∑
k=1
lkδk +
m∑
k=1
hk
(
m∑
l=k
δl
)
. From this, it follows that
Ri =
m∑
j=1
ηi,jδj , where each ηi,j is the sum of suitable lk’s and hk’s.
In the reductions, we call the candidates corresponding to the elements of the sets in 3DM, the element candidates.
We will often need to define some arbitrary total order on a set of candidates with specific properties. For a set S, we
denote an arbitrary total order on S as
−→
S . For a, b ∈ S, if we want a to be in a higher position than b, i.e., a has score
less than or equal to b, in the total order, we simply state that b  a in −→S .
We start with the reduction from 3DM to the PW-PC problem with respect to 2-approval, and then show how to extend
the reduction to the PW-PC problem with respect to an arbitrary 2-valued rule other than plurality and veto. This is an
interesting case because, as mentioned in the Introduction, the PW problem with respect to 2-approval is in P, when
restricted to partitioned partial orders [12] and to truncated partial orders [8].
3.2 Hardness of PW-PC w.r.t. 2-valued rules
We first present the reduction of 3DM to PW-PC w.r.t. 2-approval, and then prove its correctness.
Reduction 1. Let (X ,Y,Z,S ) be a 3DM instance where S = {S1, . . . St} ⊆ X × Y × Z such that Si =
(xi1 , yi2 , zi3), for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. We construct an instance of the PW-PC problem as follows.
1. The set of candidates is C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {c, d1, w} where the sets X,Y, and Z comprise of candidates
corresponding to the elements of the sets X ,Y, and Z of the 3DM instance.
2. We construct the partial profile P as follows.
• For each Si = (xi1 , yi2 , zi3), let C ′i = C \ ({xi1 , yi2 , zi3} ∪ {d1}) and
−→
C ′i be such that c  w, i.e., w is
in a position higher than that of c.
p′i = xi1  yi2  zi3 > d1 
−→
C ′i
pi = xi1  yi2 
−→
C ′i
• P = ⋃li=1 pi is a partial profile where each vote is a partial chain.
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P ′ =
⋃l
i=1 p
′
i is a total profile. Moreover, each p
′
i extends pi. Let s(P
′, c) = λP ′ = 0. Since w is placed
at a position greater c in all the votes of P ′, we have s(P ′, w) = λP ′ .
3. Consider C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {c, d1} ∪ {w}. Let {w} be the set D required in Lemma 1 and R be as follows.
• Rxi = 1−
(
s(P ′, xi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Ryi = 1−
(
s(P ′, yi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Rzi = −1−
(
s(P ′, zi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Rd1 = −q −
(
s(P ′, d1)− λP ′
)
.
• Rc = 0.
4. By Lemma 1, there exist a λQ ∈ N and a total profileQ which can be constructed in time polynomial in m
such that the scores of the candidates in the profile P ′ ∪Q are as follows. Let λP ′ + λQ = λ.
• For all x ∈ X , we have s(P ′ ∪Q, x) = s(P ′, x) + s(Q, x)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, x)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rx) = λ+ 1.
• For all y ∈ Y , we have s(P ′ ∪Q, y) = s(P ′, y) + s(Q, y)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, y)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Ry) = λ+ 1.
• For all z ∈ Z, we have s(P ′ ∪Q, z) = s(P ′, z) + s(Q, z)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, z)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rz) = λ− 1.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, c) = s(P ′, c) + s(Q, c) = λP ′ + λQ = λ.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, d1) = s(P ′, d1) + s(Q, d1)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, d1)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rd1) = λ− q.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, w) = s(P ′, w) + s(Q, w) < λP ′ + λQ < λ.
5. We let C, the partial profile V = P ∪Q, and c be the input to the PW-PC problem.
Proposition 1. Let P ,P ′, and Q be the profiles as in the construction above. For all P which extend P , we have
s(P ∪Q, c) = s(P ′ ∪Q, c) = λ.
Proof. Recall that the scoring vector is (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0). By construction, in every completion of the partial chain pi in
P , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, candidate c is always in a position greater than two. Thus, for all total profiles P which extend the
partial profile P , the score of c never changes.
Lemma 2. PW-PC w.r.t. 2-approval is NP-complete.
Proof. Given a 3DM instance (X ,Y,Z,S ), we construct a PW-PC instance, (C,V = P ∪ Q, c), according to
Reduction 1. Let |C| = m.
First, we prove the ⇐= direction. Assume that the instance (C,V = P ∪Q, c) of the PW-PC problem obtained from
the reduction is a positive one. Therefore, there exists a total profile P ∗ =
⋃l
i=1 p
∗
i such that
• for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, we have p∗i extends pi;
• c is a possible winner and, by Proposition 1, has score λ.
When we say that a candidate “gains" or “loses" points, it is in relation to the complete profile P ′ in the reduction.
1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ q, each element candidate xi in X , , has to lose at least one point. Since a candidate can lose
at most one point in any vote, let p∗ki be the vote in which the element candidate xi loses a point, where
1 ≤ i ≤ q. Let K = {ki|1 ≤ i ≤ q}.
2. Observe that in all the q votes in K, both d1 and an element candidate from Z must be in the top two positions.
Without loss of generality, assume that, in these q votes, candidate d1 is in the first position and the element
candidate from Z is in the second position.
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3. Therefore, candidate d1 gains a total of q points. Since each z ∈ Z can gain at most a point, the element
candidate of Z in the second position in each of the above q votes must be distinct, i.e., no two votes in K
have the same element candidate of Z in the second position.
4. By construction, candidates d1 and z cannot gain any more points. Since c is a possible winner, it must be the
case that each of the q element candidates in Y also lost at least a point each in the q votes in K. Therefore,
the element candidates of Y in the q votes in K must be distinct.
5. Therefore, the set {Si|i ∈ K} must form a cover for X ∪ Y ∪ Z.
Now, we prove the other direction. Let (X ,Y,Z,S ) be a positive instance of 3DM. LetS ′ ⊆ S be the cover. Recall
that |S ′| = q. We show that c is, indeed, a possible winner in the PW-PC instance constructed as above.
1. We extend each partial vote pi ∈ P as follows.
p∗i : d1  zi3  xi1  yi2 
−→
C ′i if Si ∈ S ′
p∗i : xi1  yi2  zi3  d1 
−→
C ′i if Si /∈ S ′
Let P ∗ =
⋃l
i=1 p
∗
i .
1 1 0 0 . . . 0
xi1 yi2 zi3 d1 Ci if Si ∈ S ′
d1 zi3 xi1 yi2 Ci if Si /∈ S ′
Table 1: Completions for 2-approval.
2. The following are the scores of the candidates in the profile P ∗ ∪Q. Recall, that s(P ∗ ∪Q, c) = λ.
• For all x ∈ X, we have s(P ∗ ∪Q, x) = s(P ∗, x) + s(Q, x) = s(P ′, x)− 1 + s(Q, x)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, x)− λP ′
)− 1 + (λQ +Rx) = λ.
• For all y ∈ Y,we have s(P ∗ ∪Q, y) = s(P ∗, y) + s(Q, y) = s(P ′, y)− 1 + s(Q, y)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, y)− λP ′
)− 1 + (λQ +Ry) = λ.
• For all z ∈ Z, we have s(P ∗ ∪Q, z) = s(P ∗, z) + s(Q, z) = s(P ′, z) + 1 + s(Q, z)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, z)− λP ′
)
+ 1 + (λQ +Rz) = λ.
• s(P ∗ ∪Q, c) = s(P ∗, c) + s(Q, c) = s(P ′, c) + s(Q, c) = λP ′ + λQ = λ.
• s(P ∗ ∪Q, d1) = s(P ∗, d1) + s(Q, d1) = s(P ′, d1) + q + s(Q, d1)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, d1)− λP ′
)
+ q + (λQ +Rd1) = λ.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, w) = s(P ′, w) + s(Q, w) < λP ′ + λQ < λ.
Therefore, c is a possible winner.
Next, we generalise the construction to all 2-valued rules.
Lemma 3. If r is a 2-valued rule, then PW-PC w.r.t. r is NP-complete.
Proof. (Outline) The set C of candidates is the same as in the reduction for 2-approval. One can always construct the
total profile P ′ = ∪li=1p′i, such that in the vote p′i, corresponding to Si ∈ S , candidates xi1 and yi2 are in the two
highest positions with score value one, and candidates zi3 and d1 are in the two lowest positions with score value zero.
The score of each candidate in the profile P ′ ∪Q is set identical to that in the reduction for 2-approval. We drop d1 and
zi3 in each p
′
i to obtain the partial profile P . More precisely, if the scoring vector is (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, 0, 0, . . . , 0), we do the
following.
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• For each Si, we construct a total order p′i such that candidates xi1 and yi2 are in positions k − 1 and k
respectively, while candidates zi3 and d are in positions k + 1 and k + 2.
p′i =
−→
C1i  xi1  yi2  zi3  d1 
−→
C2i ,
where C1i and C
2
i are partitions of C \ {xi1 , yi2 , zi3 , d1} such that |C1i | = r − 2 and C2i = C \(
C1i ∪ {xi1 , yi2 , zi3 , d1}
)
. Since 2 ≤ r ≤ (m − 2), the positions (k − 1), k, (k + 1), and (k + 2) are
always valid.
• Construct partial votes pi by dropping d1 and zi3 from p′i.
• For Proposition 1 to hold for all 2-valued scoring rules, one ensures that and |C1i | = k − 2 where k is the
number of times the largest score value is in the scoring vector.
• To apply Lemma 1, one ensures that in each p′i candidate c is an position smaller than that of w.
• The relative scores of each candidate in the profile P ′ ∪Q is set in a way similar to that in the reduction for
2-approval (Reduction 1), and thus the proof of ⇐= direction is similar.
• For the =⇒ direction, the partial chains in P are completed as in Table 2. This makes the score of candidate
c greater than or equal to the score of all the other candidates.
1 . . . 1 1 0 0 . . . 0
−→
C1i xi1 yi2 zi3 d1
−→
C2i if Si ∈ S ′−→
C1i d1 zi3 xi1 yi2
−→
C2i if Si /∈ S ′
Table 2: Completions for a 2-valued rules.
3.3 Hardness of PW-PC w.r.t. p-valued rules, where p ≥ 3
In this section, we show NP-completeness of p-valued positional scoring rules, for p ≥ 3. Consider a p-valued rule,
where p ≥ 3, which has a size m scoring vector with the distinct values a1 > a2 > . . . > ap, we define, for 1 ≤ j ≤ p,
a function `(m, j) which returns the number of times the score value aj repeats in the scoring vector. Schematically, a
scoring vector of a p-valued rule, where p ≥ 3, can be represented as follows.a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,1)
, a2, . . . , a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,2)
, . . . , ap, . . . , ap︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,p)

The following proposition follows from the purity of the scoring rules considered in this paper.
Proposition 2. Let r be a p-valued scoring rule. For all positive integers γ, there exists a length m ≤ γp such that, in
the scoring vector sm, there exists 1 ≤ u ≤ p such that `(m,u) = γ.
We give the reduction first and then prove its correctness.
Reduction 2. Let I = (X ,Y,Z,S ) be a 3DM instance, with |X | = |Y| = |Z| = q. Let r be the p-valued scoring
rule which has scoring vectors with blocks of repeating score values. More precisely, in the scoring vector of length
m, the score value aj repeats `(m, j) times, for 1 ≤ j ≤ p. Let δj = aj − aj+1, for 1 ≤ j < p. Let γ = 3q. By
Proposition 2, there is a number m ≤ 3qp such that in the scoring vector sm, there exists 1 ≤ u ≤ p such that the block
of repeating score value au has length `(m′, u) = 3q. We consider the following three cases.
Case 1. u = 1
Case 2. u = p
Case 3. 1 < u < p
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We construct the PW-PC instance as follows.
1. The set of candidates is C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {c, w} ∪H where c denotes the distinguished candidate, the sets
X,Y, and Z comprise of candidates corresponding to the elements of the sets X ,Y and Z . The set H consists
of dummy candidates such that |H| = m− 3q + 2.
2. We construct the partial profile P as follows.
• For each Si = (xi1 , yi2 , zi3), let C ′i = C \ ({xi1 , yi2 , zi3} ∪ H). Let
−→
C ′i be such that candidate c is
ranked lower than w, i.e., we have c  w.
Case 1. u = 1. Let H1 ⊆ H such that |H1| = `(m, 2)− 1 and H ′ = H \H1.
p′i =
−→
C ′i  xi1  yi2 
−→
H1  zi3 
−→
H ′
pi =
−→
C ′i  yi2 
−→
H1  zi3 
−→
H ′
Case 2. u = p. Let H1 ⊆ H such that |H1| = `(m, p− 1)− 1 and H ′ = H \H1.
p′i =
−→
H ′  xi1  yi2 
−→
H1  zi3 
−→
C ′i
pi =
−→
H ′  yi2 
−→
H1  zi3 
−→
C ′i
Case 3. 1 < u < p. Let H1 ⊆ H such that |H1| =
u−2∑
i=1
`(m, i) + `(m,u− 1)− 1 and H ′ = H \H1.
p′i =
−→
H1  xi1  yi2 
−→
C ′i  zi3 
−→
H ′
pi =
−→
H1  yi2 
−→
C ′i  zi3 
−→
H ′
• P = ⋃li=1 pi is a partial profile where each vote is a partial chain.
P ′ =
⋃l
i=1 p
′
i is a total profile. Moreover, each p
′
i extends pi. Let s(P
′, c) = λP ′ . Since w is placed at a
position greater c in all the votes of P ′, we have s(P ′, w) < λP ′ .
3. Consider C = X ∪ Y ∪Z ∪ {c} ∪H ∪ {w}. Let {w} be the set D required in Lemma 1 and R be as follows.
Case 1. u = 1
• Rxi = δ1 + δ2 −
(
s(P ′, xi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Ryi = −δ1 −
(
s(P ′, yi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Rzi = −δ2 −
(
s(P ′, zi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Rc = 0.
• Rh = 0−
(
s(P ′, h)− λP ′
)
, for all h ∈ H .
Case 2. u = p
• Rxi = δp−2 + δp−1 −
(
s(P ′, xi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Ryi = −δp−2 −
(
s(P ′, yi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Rzi = −δp−1 −
(
s(P ′, zi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Rc = 0.
• Rh = 0−
(
s(P ′, h)− λP ′
)
, for all h ∈ H.
Case 3. 1 < u < p
• Rxi = δu−1 + δu −
(
s(P ′, xi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Ryi = −δu−1 −
(
s(P ′, yi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Rzi = −δu −
(
s(P ′, zi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Rc = 0.
• Rh = 0−
(
s(P ′, h)− λP ′
)
, for all h ∈ H.
4. By Lemma 1, there exist a λQ ∈ N and a total profileQ which can be constructed in time polynomial in m′
such that the scores of the candidates in the profile P ′ ∪Q are as follows. Let λP ′ + λQ = λ.
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Case 1. u = 1
• For all x ∈ X , we have s(P ′ ∪Q, x) = s(P ′, x) + s(Q, x)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, x)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rx) = λ+ δ2 + δ1.
• For all y ∈ Y , we have s(P ′ ∪Q, y) = s(P ′, y) + s(Q, y)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, y)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Ry) = λ− δ1.
• For all z ∈ Z, we have s(P ′ ∪Q, z) = s(P ′, z) + s(Q, z)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, z)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rz) = λ− δ2.
Case 2. u = p
• For all x ∈ X , we have s(P ′ ∪Q, x) = s(P ′, x) + s(Q, x)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, x)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rx) = λ+ δp−2 + δp−1.
• For all y ∈ Y , we have s(P ′ ∪Q, y) = s(P ′, y) + s(Q, y)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, y)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Ry) = λ− δp−2.
• For all z ∈ Z, we have s(P ′ ∪Q, z) = s(P ′, z) + s(Q, z)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, z)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rz) = λ− δp−1.
Case 3.
• For all x ∈ X , we have s(P ′ ∪Q, x) = s(P ′, x) + s(Q, x)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, x)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rx) = λ+ δu + δu−1.
• For all y ∈ Y , we have s(P ′ ∪Q, y) = s(P ′, y) + s(Q, y)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, y)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Ry) = λ− δu−1.
• For all z ∈ Z, we have s(P ′ ∪Q, z) = s(P ′, z) + s(Q, z)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, z)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rz) = λ− δu.
For all the cases, the score of candidate c, the dummy candidates in H , and w in the profile P ′ ∪Q are the
same.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, c) = s(P ′, c) + s(Q, c) = λP ′ + λQ = λ.
• For all h ∈ H, we have
s(P ′ ∪Q, h) = s(P ′, h) + s(Q, h) = (λP ′ + s(P ′, h)− λP ′)+ (λQ +Rh) = λ.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, w) = s(P ′, w) + s(Q, w) < λP ′ + λQ < λ.
5. We let C, the profile V = P ∪Q, and c be the input to the PW-PC problem.
Lemma 4. Let r be a p-valued scoring rule, where p ≥ 3. Reduction 2 is a polynomial time reduction of 3DM to
PW-PC w.r.t. r.
Proof. We prove the “ =⇒ " direction first. Let (X ,Y,Z,S ) be a positive instance of 3DM. Let S ′ ⊆ S be the
cover. Recall that |S ′| = q. We construct a PW-PC instance as in Reduction 2 and show that c is, indeed, a possible
winner.
1. We extend each partial vote pi ∈ P as follows.
Case 1. u = 1
p∗i =
−→
C ′i  yi2 
−→
H1  zi3  xi1 
−→
H ′ if Si ∈ S ′
p∗i =
−→
C ′i  xi1  yi2 
−→
H1  zi3 
−→
H ′ if Si /∈ S ′
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Case 2. u = p
p∗i =
−→
H ′  yi2 
−→
H1  zi3  xi1 
−→
C ′i if Si ∈ S ′
p∗i =
−→
H ′  xi1  yi2 
−→
H1  zi3 
−→
C ′i if Si /∈ S ′
Case 3. 1 < u < p
p∗i =
−→
H1  yi2 
−→
C ′i  zi3  xi1 
−→
H ′ if Si ∈ S ′
p∗i =
−→
H1  xi1  yi2 
−→
C ′i  zi3 
−→
H ′ if Si /∈ S ′
Let P ∗ =
⋃l
i=1 p
∗
i . Note that the sore of c does not change in any extension and is, therefore, λ.
2. Now, we compute the scores of all the candidates in the completed profile to verify that candidate c is, indeed,
a possible winner. We show the detailed computation for Case 1. The other two cases are similar.
Case 1. u = 1
The following are the scores of the candidates in the profile P ∗ ∪Q. Recall, that s(P ∗ ∪Q, c) = λ.
• For all x ∈ X, we have s(P ∗ ∪Q, x) = s(P ∗, x) + s(Q, x) = s(P ′, x)− (δ2 + δ1) + s(Q, x)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, x)− λP ′
)− (δ2 + δ1) + (λQ +Rx) = λ.
• For all y ∈ Y, we have s(P ∗ ∪Q, y) = s(P ∗, y) + s(Q, y) = s(P ′, y) + δp−2 + s(Q, y).
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, y)− λP ′
)
+ δ1 + (λQ +Ry) = λ.
• For all z ∈ Z, we have s(P ∗ ∪Q, z) = s(P ∗, z) + s(Q, z) = s(P ′, z) + δp−1 + s(Q, z).
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, z)− λP ′
)
+ δ2 + (λQ +Rz) = λ.
• s(P ∗ ∪Q, c) = s(P ∗, c) + s(Q, c) = s(P ′, c) + s(Q, c) = λP ′ + λQ = λ.
• For all c′ ∈ H, we have s(P ∗ ∪Q, c′) = s(P ∗, c′) + s(Q, c′) = s(P ′, c′) + 0 + s(Q, c′)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, c′)− λP ′
)
+ 0 + (λQ +Rc′) = λ.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, w) = s(P ′, w) + s(Q, w) < λP ′ + λQ < λ.
Therefore, c is a possible winner.
In the other direction, we prove the correctness of the reduction for Case 1 in full detail. The other two cases are similar.
Given a 3DM instance (X ,Y,Z,S ), we construct a PW-PC instance, (C,V = P ∪Q, c), according to the above
reduction. Assume that the PW-PC instance (C,V = P ∪Q, c) is a positive one. Therefore, there exists a total profile
P ∗ =
⋃l
i=1 p
∗
i such that
• for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, the vote p∗i extends pi;
• c is a possible winner. Moreover, no matter how the partial orders are completed, the score of c is λ.
When we say that a candidate “gains" or “loses" points, it is in relation to the complete profile P ′ in the reduction.
1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ q, each element candidate xi in X , has to lose at least (δ2 + δ1) points. Therefore, it has to be in a
position greater than `(m, 1) in at least one vote. Assume, for now, that each xi loses at least (δ2 + δ1) points
in one vote, i.e., it is in a position greater than or equal to `(m, 1) + `(m, 2). Let these q votes be pk1 , . . . , pkq
where 1 ≤ ki ≤ t and K = {ki|1 ≤ i ≤ q}.
2. For each i ∈ K, in the completion p∗i , the element candidate xi1 loses the points (and, therefore, is in position
greater than `(m, 1) + `(m, 2)), candidates zi3 and yi2 gain δ1 and δ2 points respectively.
3. By construction, each element candidate of Y can gain at most δ1 points, and each element candidate of Z can
gain at most δ2 points. Moreover, there are no votes where these element candidates can lose points. Therefore,
the element candidates of Y and the element candidates of Z, which gain points in the q votes in K must be
distinct.
12
4. We had assumed that each element candidates of X loses at least (δ2 + δ1) points in one vote. Observe that
whenever x ∈ X is in a position greater than `(m′, 1), an element candidate of Y gains the maximum points it
can without defeating c, i.e., δ1 points. Since there are q element candidates in X and q element candidates
in Y , every time an element candidate of Y gains δ1 points, an element candidate of X must lose at least
(δ1 + δ2) points.
5. The remaining partial votes in P (pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and i /∈ K), must have the same completion as in P ′.
6. Therefore, the set {Si|i ∈ K} must form a cover for X ∪ Y ∪ Z.
3.4 Hardness of PW-PC w.r.t. unbounded rules
In this section, we focus on unbounded rules. The Borda count is an example of such rules. As noted earlier, unbounded
scoring rules may have score values which repeat in blocks. Moreover, unlike Borda count, the score values can be
non-uniformly decreasing. Recall, that for a scoring vector of length m, with m′ distinct score values, the function
`(m, j) returns the number of times the distinct score value aj repeats in a block, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m′. Schematically, such
a scoring vector can be represented as
a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,1)
, a2, . . . , a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,2)
, . . . , am′ , . . . , am′︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,m′)
 .
Now, we prove a fundamental property of scoring vectors of all unbounded rules.
Proposition 3. Let r be a positional scoring rule and let γ and β be two positive integers greater than 1. Consider
the scoring vector sm of r with length m = γβ. Then either sm contains at least β distinct values or there exists
1 ≤ u ≤ γβ such that `(γβ, u) ≥ γ.
Proof. If the scoring vector of length γβ contains at least β distinct values we are done. Assume it contains fewer than
β distinct values. But, by the monotonicity of the rules, if two score values are the same, then they must be in the same
block. So, we must have a block in which the same score value repeats more than γ times, else the total length would
be less than γβ, i.e., there exists u ≤ γβ such that `(γβ, u) ≥ γ.
Reduction 3. Let (X ,Y,Z,S ) be a 3DM instance where and S = {S1, . . . St} ⊆ X × Y × Z such that Si =
(xi1 , yi2 , zi3), for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Let sm be the scoring vector of length m = (3q + 4)(3q). By Proposition 3, we need to
consider the following two cases.
• Case 1. There exists a u such that `(m,u) = 3q.
• Case 2. There are m′ = 3q + 4 distinct values.
For Case 1, the reduction mimics Reduction 2 to create a PW-PC instance. For Case 2, the reduction proceeds as
follows.
Let a1 > a2 > . . . > am′ be the m′ distinct values. We define δ = (δ1, . . . , δm′−1) where, δj = aj − aj+1, for
1 ≤ j < m′.
We construct the following instance of the PW-PC problem.
1. The set of candidates is C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {c, g, d, w} ∪ H where X , Y , and Z contains candidates
corresponding to the elements in X ,Y, and Z respectively. These candidates are called elements candidates.
The set H contains dummy candidates such that |H| = m−m′.
2. We construct the partial profile P as follows.
• Let the set H be partitioned into H1, . . . ,Hm′ , such that |Hj | = `(m, j) − 1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m′. For
each Si = (xi1 , yi2 , zi3), let C
′
i = C \
(
{xi1 , yi2 , zi3} ∪ {g, d} ∪
m′⋃
j=m′−4
Hj
)
and
−→
C ′i be such that the
dummy candidates in Hj are in a position with score value aj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ m′ − 3 and candidate c is
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ranked lower than candidate w.
p′i =
−→
C ′i  g 
−→
Hm′−4  d  −→Hm′−3  xi1 
−→
Hm′−2  yi2 
−→
Hm′−1  zi3 
−→
Hm′
pi =
−→
C ′i 
−→
Hm′−4  d  −→Hm′−3  xi1 
−→
Hm′−2  yi2 
−→
Hm′−1  zi3 
−→
Hm′
• P = ⋃li=1 pi is partial profile where each vote is a partial chain where only one candidate (g) has been
dropped.
• P ′ = ⋃li=1 p′i is a total profile. Moreover, each p′i extends pi. Let s(P ′, c) = λP ′ . Observe that
s(P ′, w) < λP ′ since w is in a position greater c in all
−→
C ′i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
3. Consider C = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {c, g, d} ∪ {w}. Let {w} be the set D required in Lemma 1 and R be as follows
• Rxi = −δm′−3 −
(
s(P ′, xi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Ryi = −δm′−2 −
(
s(P ′, yi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Rzi = −δm′−1 −
(
s(P ′, zi)− λP ′
)
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Rc = 0.
• Rg = q
(
4∑
j=1
δm′−j
)
− (s(P ′, g)− λP ′) .
• Rd = −q(δm′−4)− (s(P ′, d)− λP ′).
• Rh = 0− s(P ′, h)− λP ′ , for all h ∈ H.
4. By Lemma 1, there exist a λQ ∈ N and a total profileQ which can be constructed in time polynomial in m′
such that the scores of the candidates in the profile P ′ ∪Q are as follows. Let λP ′ + λQ = λ.
• For all x ∈ X , we have s(P ′ ∪Q, x) = s(P ′, x) + s(Q, x)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, x)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rx) = λ− δm′−3.
• For all y ∈ Y , we have s(P ′ ∪Q, y) = s(P ′, y) + s(Q, y)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, y)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Ry) = λ− δm′−2.
• For all z ∈ Z, we have s(P ′ ∪Q, z) = s(P ′, z) + s(Q, z)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, z)− λP ′
)
+ (λQ +Rz) = λ− δm′−1.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, c) = s(P ′, c) + s(Q, c) = λP ′ + λQ = λ.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, g) = s(P ′, g) + s(Q, g) = (λP ′ + s(P ′, g)− λP ′)+ (λQ +Rg) = λ+ q
(
4∑
j=1
δm′−j
)
.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, d) = s(P ′, d) + s(Q, d) = (λP ′ + s(P ′, d)− λP ′)+ (λQ +Rd) = λ− q(δm′−4).
• For all h ∈ H, we have
s(P ′ ∪Q, h) = s(P ′, h) + s(Q, h) = (λP ′ + s(P ′, h)− λP ′)+ (λQ +Rh) = λ.
• s(P ′ ∪Q, w) = s(P ′, w) + s(Q, w) < λP ′ + λQ < λ.
5. We let C, the profile V = P ∪Q, and c be the input to the PW-PC problem.
The following propositions follow quite naturally from the construction of the partial profile in the above reduction
(Reduction 3).
Proposition 4. Let P ,P ′, andQ be the profiles as constructed in Reduction 3. For all total profiles P that extend P ,
we have s(P ∪Q, c) ≤ s(P ′ ∪Q, c) ≤ λ.
Proposition 5. Let P ,P ′, andQ be the profiles as constructed in Reduction 3. For all total profiles P that extend P ,
if c is a possible winner in P ∪Q then s(P ∪Q, c) = s(P ∪Q, c) = λ.
Note that the converse of the above proposition is not true.
Lemma 5. Let r be an unbounded scoring rule. Reduction 3 is a polynomial time reduction of 3DM to PW-PC w.r.t. r.
14
Proof. Given a 3DM instance I = (X ,Y,Z,S ), we construct a PW instance, (C, V = P ∪ Q, c), according to
Reduction 3. Note that there are two cases in the reduction. In both the cases, the PW instance is polynomial in |I|. For
Case 1, correctness follows from Lemma 4. Here, we consider Case 2.
First, we prove the ‘⇐= ′ direction. Assume that the PW-PC instance (C, V = P ∪Q, c) obtained above is a positive
one. Therefore, there exists a total profile P ∗ =
⋃l
i=1 p
∗
i such that
• for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, the vote p∗i extends pi;
• c is a possible winner and, by Proposition 5, has score λ.
In the following, when one says that a candidate "gains" or "loses" points, it is in relation to the complete profile P ′ in
the reduction.
1. Candidate g must lose at least q
4∑
j=1
δm′−j points for c to be a possible winner. Therefore, it must be in a
position greater than
m′−4∑
j=1
`(m, j) at least q times.
2. Whenever g is in a position greater than m−
m′∑
j=m′−3
`(m, j), candidate d gains δm′−4. Since d cannot gain
more than q(δm′−4) points, there are at most q votes where g is in position greater than m−
m′∑
j=m′−3
`(m, j).
Let these votes be p∗k1 , . . . , p
∗
kq
where each 1 ≤ kj ≤ t and K = {kj |1 ≤ j ≤ q}.
3. Note that candidate g has to lose at least q(
4∑
j=1
δm′−j) points in these q votes. This is possible if and only if it
is in position greater than
m′−1∑
j=1
`(m, j). Furthermore, whenever g is in position greater than
m′−1∑
j=1
`(m, j) in
a vote p∗i , candidate xi1 gains δm′−3 points, candidate yi2 gains δm′−2 points, and candidate i3 gain δm′−1
points, for i ∈ K.
4. Since |X| = |Y | = |Z| = q, and each x ∈ X can gain at most δm−3 points, each y ∈ Y can gain at most
δm′−2 points, and each z ∈ Z can gain at most δm′−1 points, it must be the case that the element candidates
of Y and Z which gained points in the q votes in K are distinct.
5. Since no other candidate can gain any more points, the remaining partial votes in P (pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and
i /∈ K), must have the same completion as in P ′.
6. Therefore, the set {Si|i ∈ K} must form a cover for X ∪ Y ∪ Z.
For the ‘ =⇒ ’ direction, let (X ,Y,Z,S ), is a positive instance. We show that in the PW instance, (C, V = P ∪Q, c),
constructed in the reduction, c is, indeed, a possible winner. By hypothesis, there is aS ′ ⊆ S and |S ′| = q.
1. Complete each vote pi ∈ P to p∗i .
• p∗i =
−→
C ′i 
−→
Hm′−4  d  −→Hm′−3  xi1 
−→
Hm′−2  yi2 
−→
Hm′−1  zi3  g 
−→
Hm′ if Si ∈ S ′
• p∗i =
−→
C ′i  g 
−→
Hm′−4  d  −→Hm′−3  xi1 
−→
Hm′−2  yi2 
−→
Hm′−1  zi3 
−→
Hm′ if Si /∈ S ′
Let P ∗ =
⋃l
i=1 p
∗
i . Note that the score of candidate c does not change in these votes and is, therefore, λ.
2. We compute the scores of each candidate in P ∗ ∪Q.
• For all x ∈ X, we have s(P ∗ ∪Q, x) = s(P ∗, x) + s(Q, x) = s(P ′, x) + δm′−3 + s(Q, x)
= λP ′ + s(P
′, x)− λP ′ + δm′−3 + λQ +Rx = λ.
• For all y ∈ Y, we have s(P ∗ ∪Q, y) = s(P ∗, y) + s(Q, y) = s(P ′, y) + δm′−2 + s(Q, y)
= λP ′ + s(P
′, y)− λP ′ + δm′−2 + (λQ +Ry) = λ.
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• For all z ∈ Z, we have s(P ∗ ∪Q, z) = s(P ∗, z) + s(Q, z) = s(P ′, z) + δm′−1 + s(Q, z)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, z)− λP ′
)
+ δm′−1 + (λQ +Rz) = λ.
• s(P ∗ ∪Q, c) = s(P ∗, c) + s(Q, c) = s(P ′, c) + s(Q, c) = λP ′ + λQ = λ.
• s(P ∗ ∪Q, g) = s(P ∗, g) + s(Q, g) = s(P ′, g)− q
4∑
j=1
δm′−j + s(Q, g)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, g)− λP ′
)− q 4∑
j=1
δm′−j + (λQ +Rd) = λ.
• s(P ∗ ∪Q, d) = s(P ∗, d) + s(Q, d) = s(P ′, d) + (δm′−4)q + s(Q, d)
=
(
λP ′ + s(P
′, d)− λP ′
)
+ (δm′−4)q + (λQ +Rd) = λ.
• The score of the candidates inH remain unchanged, i.e., for all h ∈ H, s(P ∗∪Q, h) = s(P ′∪Q, h) = λ.
Therefore, c is a possible winner.
4 Beyond Partial Chains
Partitioned preferences [12] and truncated preferences [8] are two restricted types of partial orders that have received
attention in the literature.
Definition 4. Let  be a partial order on a set C.
• We say that  is a partitioned preference if C can be partitioned into disjoint subsets A1, ..., Aq such that:
(a) for all i < j ≤ q, if c ∈ Ai and c′ ∈ Aj then c  c′;
(b) for each i < q, the elements in Ai are incomparable under  (i.e., a  b and b  a, for every a, b ∈ Ai).
• We say that  is a doubly-truncated ballot if there is a permutation pi over {1, . . . , |C|} and natural numbers t,
b such that  is of the form cpi(1)  . . .  cpi(t)  {cpi(t+1), . . . , cpi(m−b)}  cpi(m−b+1)  . . .  cpi(m).
• A doubly-truncated ballot is called top-truncated if b = 0; it is called bottom-truncated if t = 0.
Note that doubly-truncated ballots are a special case of partitioned preferences; thus, so are top-truncated ballots and
bottom-truncated ballots.
We write PW-PP to denote the the restriction of the PW problem to partial profiles consisting of partitioned preferences.
Similarly, we write PW-DTB, PW-TTB, and PW-BTB for the restriction of the PW problem to partial profiles consisting
of, respectively, doubly-truncated, top-truncated, and bottom-truncated preferences.
The PW-PP problem has been studied in [12]. Before summarising the main results of that paper, we introduce the
concept of a differentiating rule and notation for a family of rules.
Definition 5. A scoring rule r is differentiating if there exists a n0 ∈ N0 such that for all m > n0, the scoring
vector sm contains two positions i and j, where 1 ≤ i < j < m, such that (si − si+1) > (sj − sj+1). We say r is
non-differentiating if it is not differentiating.
Let f and l be two positive integers (f for “first" and l for “last"). We write R(f, l) to denote the 3-valued rule with
scoring vectors sm = (2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
f
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−f−l
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
). Note that R(1, 1) is the rule (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) encountered earlier.
The result in [12, Theorem 5] along with [15, Lemma 6] provide the following (incomplete) classification of the
PW-PP problem.
Theorem 3. [12, 15] Let r be a pure positional scoring rule. Then the following statements hold.
• If r is 2-valued or if r is the rule R(1, 1), then the PW-PP problem is in P.
• If r is a differentiating rule, then the PW-PP problem is in NP-complete.
• If r is a non-differentiating p-valued rule, where p ≥ 3, other than R(f, l) with f + l > 2, then the PW-PP
problem w.r.t. r is NP-complete.
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• If r is an non-differentiating rule, such that all scoring vectors have at least four distinct values, then the
PW-PP problem w.r.t. r is NP-complete.
The complexity of the PW-PP problem remains open for the rules R(f, l) with f + l > 2. Since PW-DTB is a special
case of PW-PP, the P results in Theorem 3 also hold for the PW-DTB problem. Note that the P result for 2-valued rules
generalises an earlier result in [8], which established that the PW-DTB problem w.r.t. t-approval is in P. Moreover, the
partial profile constructed in the NP-hardness proof for all differentiating rules in [15, Lemma 6] and for p-valued rules
with p ≥ 4 in [12, Lemma 13] has only doubly-truncated ballots. Therefore, the PW-DTB problem w.r.t. p-valued rules
with p ≥ 4 is also NP-complete. We further note that the NP-hardness for non-differentiating unbounded rules with
scoring vectors containing at least four distinct values is obtained as a corollary to [12, Lemma 14]. The proof of this
lemma implicitly uses doubly-truncated profiles. This is a generalisation of an earlier result in [6, 7], which established
that the PW-DTB problem is NP-complete for Borda count. Thus, the existing results for the PW-DTB problem can be
summarised as follows.
Theorem 4. [6, 7, 8, 15, 12] The following are true.
• If r is a 2-valued rule or r is the rule R(1, 1), then the PW-DTB problem w.r.t. r is in P.
• If r is a 3-valued rule other than R(f, l) with f + 1 > 2, or r is a p-valued rule, where p ≥ 4, or r is an
unbounded rule with scoring vectors containing at least four distinct score values, then the PW-DTB problem
w.r.t. r is NP-complete.
Therefore, the complexity of the PW-DTB problem w.r.t. unbounded rules with scoring vector containing three distinct
score values remains open.
Since PW-TTB and PW-BTB are special cases of PW-DTB, the P results in Theorem 3 and in Theorem 4 also hold
for PW-TTB and PW-BTB problems. The complexity of these two problems w.r.t p-valued rules, where p ≥ 3, other
than the rule R(1, 1), and unbounded rules remain open. We settle the complexity of PW-TTB and PW-DTB w.r.t. a
broad group of unbounded rules (such that all scoring vectors containing at least three distinct values and satisfies some
additional properties) and a restricted group of 3 valued rules. This implies the NP-completeness of PW-DTB problem
w.r.t. the same group of unbounded rules.
4.1 Maximum partial score
Before presenting the reductions, we introduce a few general notions which will help us reason about partial preferences
beyond partial chains, namely doubly-truncated and partitioned preferences.
Definition 6. Let C be a set of candidates and P be a partial profile.
• We say that a candidate c′ ∈ C is fixed in a partial vote p ∈ P if c has the same position in all extensions p∗ of
pi.
• We say that a candidate c′ ∈ C is fixed in the partial profile P if c′ is fixed in every vote in P , i.e., for every
pi ∈ P , there is an integer bi such that c has position bi in every extension p∗i of pi. (Note that, in general, bi
depends on pi.)
• We say that a position b in a partial vote is available if there is no fixed candidate in b, i.e., there exists no
candidate c′ ∈ C such that c′ is in position b in all extensions p∗ of p.
• Let fixedP (c′) be the total score made by c′ ∈ C from those votes in P where c′ is fixed.
Let P be a doubly-truncated profile. A candidate is fixed in P if for every pi ∈ P, candidate c is in the top or in the
bottom.
We need the notion of maximum partial score, introduced in [4], to reason about the completions of doubly-truncated
profiles. Since we consider only doubly-truncated profiles in this section, our discussion will be focused on these
kinds of votes. However, we note that the notion of maximum partial score can be used for any partial profile
where the distinguished candidate is fixed. Before presenting the notion formally,we present an example. Consider a
doubly-truncated profile which contains the following partial votes.
p1 :e3  c  e1  {e2, e4, e7}  e6
p2 :e1  {e2, e4, e7, e3}  e6  c.
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The candidate c is fixed in both p1 and p2. Therefore, c is fixed in the profile. Candidate e3 is fixed in p1 but not in p2.
Let P be a partial profile where candidate c is fixed. LetQ be a total profile. Let P be an extension of P . The score of
c in P ∪Q, namely, s(P ∪Q, c) = λ. For a candidate c′ 6= c, the maximum partial score of c′, denoted smax(c′,P ,Q),
is defined as smax(c′,P ,Q) = λ − s(c′,Q). Intuitively, there exists no completion P of P such that c is a possible
winner in P ∪Q and c′ has a score more than smax(c′,P ,Q) in P .
Since, in a doubly-truncated vote, all the candidates which are not in the top or in the bottom are not ordered, the
concept of maximum partial score makes it convenient to reason about the completions of such votes. Furthermore, it
helps us define the tightness property [4], which will be extremely helpful in proving the correctness of our reductions.
Definition 7. Let C be a set of candidates, c ∈ C be a distinguished candidate, P be a partial profile such that c is
fixed in P , andQ be a total profile. We say that P ∪Q has the tightness property if the sum of the score values of all
the available positions in all the partial votes in P is equal to the quantity
∑
c′∈C\{c}
smax(c′,P ,Q)− fixedP (c′).
The following proposition is quite obvious.
Proposition 6. Let C be a set of candidates, c ∈ C be a distinguished candidate, P be a partial profile in which c is
fixed, andQ be a total profile. Let P be an extension of P such that c is a winner in P ∪Q. If P ∪Q has the tightness
property, then s(P ∪Q, c′) = smax(c′,P ,Q) for every candidate c′ ∈ C \ {c}.
Proof. Otherwise, there exists another candidate c′′ ∈ C \ {c} which makes more than smax(c′′,P ,Q) and, thus,
defeats c.
The reductions in this section require construction of partial profiles where candidates have certain pre-specified
maximum partial scores. There is a polynomial time algorithm [4, Lemma 1] to construct votes to realise the maximum
partial scores of the candidates. We restate this fact as follows.
Lemma 6. [4] Given a scoring rule r with the scoring vector (s1, . . . , sm), a set C of m candidates with distinguished
candidate c ∈ C, a value µ(c′), for all c′ ∈ C \ {c}, and a partial profile P where the following properties hold.
1. Candidate c is fixed in P .
2. For every c′ ∈ C \ {c}, the value µ(c′) can be written as a sum of at most |P | integers from s1, . . . , sm.
Formally, µ(c′) =
m∑
j=1
njsj where nj ∈ N0 denotes how often the score value sj is added. Moreover,
m∑
j=1
nj ≤ |P |,
3. There is a dummy candidate w, such that w cannot beat the distinguished c in any extension.
Then, a set Q of total votes can be constructed in time polynomial in |P | and m, such that for all c′ ∈ C \ {c}, we
have smax(c′,P ,Q) = µ(c′).
We conclude with a proposition on a linear combination of two distinct numbers which will help us prove correctness of
the reductions.
Proposition 7. Let a1 and a2 be two distinct numbers. Let n1 and n2 be two natural numbers and S = n1a1 + n2a2.
There exists no n1 6= n3 and n2 6= n4, such that n1 + n2 = n3 + n4 and n3a1 + n4a2 = S.
Proof. Suppose there exists n3 6= n1 and n4 6= n2 such that n1 + n2 = n3 + n4 and n3a1 + n4a2 = S.
By hypothesis, n1 = n3 + n4 − n2. Therefore,
n1a1 + n2a2 = n3a1 + n4a2
=⇒ (n3 + n4 − n2)a1 + n2a2 = n3a1 + n4a2
=⇒ n2a2 − n2a1 = n4a2 − n4a1
=⇒ n2(a2 − a1) = n4(a2 − a1)
Since a1 6= a2, it must be the case that n2 = n4 which is a contradiction.
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4.2 Hardness results for PW-TTB
Recall, that for a scoring vector of length m, having m′ distinct score values, the function `(m, j) returns the number
of times the distinct score value aj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ m′, repeats in a block. Schematically, such a scoring vector can be
represented as
a1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,1)
, a2, . . . , a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,2)
, . . . , am′ , . . . , am′︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,m′)

In the reduction below, we consider an unbounded rule r with the following properties. There exists a polynomial g(u)
with the property that for all u, every scoring vector sm of r with length m = g(u) has m′ ≥ 3 distinct score values,
and if the three smallest score values are am′−2 > am′−1 > am′ , it holds that m− `(m,m′ − 1)− `(m,m′) ≥ 3u.
Borda count is an obvious example. The lexicographic scoring rule given by (2m, 2m−1, . . . , 1) for m candidates is
another example of the scoring rules considered in this section.
Reduction 4. Let (X ,Y,Z,S ) be a 3DM instance where and S = {S1, . . . St} ⊆ X × Y × Z such that Si =
(xi1 , yi2 , zi3), for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and |I|. Let sm be the scoring vector of length m = g(q). The scoring vector has at least
three distinct values, i.e., m′ ≥ 3 there are values am′−2, am′−1, and am′ such that each of the lengths `(m,m′ − 1) ,
and `(m,m′) are fixed and at least one. We construct an instance of the PW-TTB problem as follows.
1. The set of candidates is C = X ∪ Y ∪Z ∪ {c, w} ∪H where X , Y , and Z contains candidates corresponding
to the elements in X ,Y, and Z respectively. These candidates are called element candidates. The set H
contains dummy candidates such that |H| = m− 3q − 2.
2. We construct the partial profile P as follows.
• Let the setH be partitioned intoH ′, Hm′−1, and Hm′ such that |Hj | = `(m, j)−1, for j = {m′−1,m′}.
H ′ = H \ (Hm′−1 ∪Hm′). For each Si = (xi1 , yi2 , zi3), let C ′i = C \ ({xi1 , yi2 , zi3} ∪Hm′−1 ∪Hm′)
and
−→
C ′i be such that c  w, i.e., candidate c is always ranked lower than w.
p′i =
−→
C ′i  xi1  yi2 
−→
Hm′−1  zi3 
−→
Hm′
pi =
−→
C ′i  ({xi1 , yi2 , zi3} ∪Hm′−1 ∪Hm′)
• P =
l⋃
i=1
pi is profile where each vote is top-truncated.
In the vote pi, note that all the candidates except {xi1 , yi2 , zi3}∪Hm′−1 ∪Hm′ are fixed. In other words,
positions |C ′i|+ 1 though m are available.
P ′ =
l⋃
i=1
p′i is a total profile. Moreover, each p
′
i extends pi. Let s(P
′, c) = λP ′ .Observe that s(P ′, w) <
λP ′ since w is in a position greater c in all
−→
C ′i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
3. For an element candidate e ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z, let fe denote the number of triples inS containing the element
of the 3DM instance corresponding to candidate e. By construction of the partial profile, candidate e is not
fixed in fe votes. Let fixedP (c′) be the total score made by c′ ∈ C from those votes in P where c′ is fixed.
Therefore, for any candidate e ∈ X ∪Y ∪Z, we have fixedP (e) =
t−fe∑
i=1
ski , where 1 ≤ ki ≤ m is the position
of e in a vote where it is fixed.
4. Consider the following.
• For all x ∈ X , we have µ(x) = am′ + (fx − 1)am′−2 + fixedP (x).
• For all y ∈ Y , we have µ(y) = am′−2 + (fy − 1)am′−1 + fixedP (y).
• For all z ∈ Z, we have µ(z) = am′−1 + (fz − 1)am′ + fixedP (z).
• For all h ∈ Hj , we have µ(h) = t(aj) where j = {m′ − 1,m′}.
• For all h′ ∈ H ′, we have µ(h) = fixedP (h′).
• µ(w) ≥ ta1.
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5. We verify that the profile P , and, for all c′ ∈ C \ {c}, the number µ(c′), as specified above, satisfy the
properties required by Lemma 6.
• Property 1: By the construction of the votes in the reduction, this property is satisfied.
• Property 2: For all e ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z, the number µ(e) is the sum of (t − fe) + (fe − 1) + 1 = t score
values. For all h ∈ H , property 2 is satisfied trivially.
• Property 3: Candidate w is fixed in P , and in every vote, has a position greater than that of c, and
therefore, can never defeat c in any extension.
Therefore, by the lemma, there is a total profileQ, which can be constructed in time polynomial in |P | and m,
such that smax(c′,P ,Q) = µ(c′), for all c′ ∈ C \ {c}.
6. We let C, the profile V = P ∪Q, and c be the input to the PW-TTB problem.
Proposition 8. The profile P ∪Q in Reduction 4 has the tightness property.
Proof. Recall that |X| = |Y | = |Z| = q. Therefore,∑
x∈X
fx = t =⇒
∑
x∈X
(fx − 1) =
∑
x∈X
fx −
∑
x∈X
1 = t− q.
Similarly,
∑
y∈Y
fy =
∑
z∈Z
fz = t and
∑
y∈Y
(fy − 1) =
∑
z∈Z
(fz − 1) = t− q.
We focus only on the available positions in the votes of P and the scores the candidates can make in these positions.
Thus, for a candidate e ∈ X,Y, and Z we consider the score smax(e,P ,Q)− fixedP (e). All candidates h′ ∈ H ′ and
the candidate w are fixed in P and therefore, contributes nothing to the sum. Whereas, all candidates h ∈ Hm′−1∪Hm′
are not fixed in any vote in P , i.e. fixedP (h) = 0. Therefore, the sum of the maximum scores which the candidates can
make in the available positions is
∑
c′∈(X∪Y ∪Z∪Hm′−1∪Hm′ )
(smax(c′,P ,Q)− fixedP (c′))
=
∑
x∈X
(smax(x,P ,Q)− fixedP (x)) +
∑
y∈Y
(smax(y,P ,Q)− fixedP (y))
+
∑
z∈Z
(smax(z,P ,Q)− fixedP (z)) +
∑
h∈Hm′−1
smax(h,P ,Q) +
∑
h∈Hm
smax(h,P ,Q)
=
∑
x∈X
(am′ + (fx − 1)am′−2) +
∑
y∈Y
(am′−2 + (fy − 1)am′−1)) +
∑
z∈Z
(am′−1 + (fz − 1)am′))
+
∑
h∈Hm′−1
t(am′−1) +
∑
h∈Hm
t(am′)
= q(am′) + (t− q)(am′−2) + q(am′−2) + (t− q)(am′−1)
+ q(am′−1) + (t− q)(am′) + (`(m,m′ − 1)− 1)t(am′−1) + (`(m,m′)− 1)t(am′)
= `(m,m′)t(am′) + `(m,m′ − 1)t(am′−1) + t(am′−2)
= t (am′−2 + `(m,m′ − 1)am′−1 + `(m,m′)am′) . (1)
Recall, that there are t votes in P , one corresponding to every triple inS . Therefore, the sum of the score values of the
available positions in the t votes , namely
• position m− `(m,m′ − 1)− `(m,m′), with score value am′−2,
• positions m− `(m,m′ − 1)− `(m,m′) + 1 through m− `(m,m′), each with score value am′−1, and
• positions m− `(m,m′) + 1 through m, with score value am′
is t (am′−2 + `(m,m′ − 1)(am′−1) + `(m′,m)am′) which is the same as in (1).
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Proposition 9. In Reduction 4, for all completions P of P , if c is a possible winner in P ∪Q then the candidate which
is in position m− `(m,m′ − 1)− `(m,m′), with score value am′−2 is an element candidate of X ∪ Y.
Proof. By the construction of the partial profile in Reduction 4, there are t votes in P . By Proposition 8, the profile
P ∪Q has the tightness property. Therefore, the sum of the maximum scores which the elements in X ∪ Y can make
from the available positions in all the votes in P is∑
x∈X
(smax(x,P ,Q)− fixedP (x)) +
∑
y∈Y
(smax(y,P ,Q)− fixedP (y))
= q(am′) + (t− q)(am′−2) + q(am′−2) + (t− q)(am′−1)
= q(am′) + t(am′−2) + (t− q)(am′−1). (2)
Let P be a completion of P . In each vote p ∈ P , an element of X ∪ Y can gain am′−2, am′−1, or am′ points. If there
exists a vote in P such that an element candidate of X ∪ Y is not in position m− `(m,m′ − 1)− `(m,m′) the total
score will be strictly less than that in 2, and therefore in violation of the tightness property.
Lemma 7. Let r be an unbounded rule such that there exists a polynomial g(u) with the property that for all u, every
scoring vector sm of r, with length m = g(u), has m′ ≥ 3 distinct score values, and if the three smallest score values
are am′−2 > am′−1 > am′ , it holds that m− `(m,m′ − 1)− `(m,m′) ≥ 3u. Then reduction 4 is a polynomial-time
reduction of 3DM to PW-TTB w.r.t. r.
Proof. Given a 3DM instance I = (X ,Y,Z,S ), we construct a PW-TTB instance, (C,V = P ∪Q, c), according
to the above reduction. We let u = |I| = q.
First, we prove the "⇐= ” direction. Assume that the PW-PC instance (C,V = P ∪Q, c) obtained above is a positive
one. Therefore, there exists a total profile P ∗ =
⋃l
i=1 p
∗
i such that
• for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, p∗i extends pi
• c is a possible winner and its score remains the same in all extensions (since by construction, c is a fixed
candidate in P ).
By Proposition 8, P has the tightness property. In the following, use tightness and other properties of P to reason about
P ∗. Recall the schematic representation of the scoring vector is. . . , am′−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥3q
, am′−1, . . . , am′−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,m′−1)
, am′ , . . . , am′︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,m′)

1. By construction and the maximum partial scores set in the reduction, all candidates h ∈ Hm′ must be in a
position with score value am′ . If any candidate h ∈ Hm′ is in a position with score value greater than am′ , it
will defeat c. Without loss of generality, assume that they are in positions positions m− `(m,m′) + 2 through
m.
2. By Proposition 9, in all the votes, the candidate in the position m− `(m,m′)− `(m,m′ − 1), which has a
score value of am′−2, is an element candidate of X ∪ Y.
3. Observe that no candidate h in Hm′−1 can be in position m− `(m,m′) + 1.
For, if there exists such an h, then, by tightness, it would have to be in position m− `(m,m′) at least once.
By 2, this is not possible.
4. Observe that, by Proposition 7, for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, in any completion of a vote pi, for Si = (xi1 , yi2 , zi3), the
element candidate corresponding to yi2 has to be in a position with score value am′−2 or am′−1. Otherwise,
since the total number of votes is fixed, it would violate tightness.
(a) Moreover, by the maximum partial scores set in the construction, for 1 ≤ i ≤ q, every yi scores am′−2
exactly once. More than once, yi defeats c and less than once violates tightness. Let these votes be
p∗k1 , . . . , p
∗
kq
, where 1 ≤ ki ≤ t and K = {ki|1 ≤ i ≤ q}.
(b) For 1 ≤ i ≤ t and i /∈ K, in p∗i , candidate yi2 is in position m− `(m,m′)− `(m,m′ − 1) + 1.
5. Thus, for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and i /∈ K, in the vote p∗i ,
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(a) by 2 and 4b, candidate xi1 is in position m− `(m,m′)− `(m,m′ − 1).
(b) zi3 must be in m− `(m,m′) + 1.
6. By the tightness property, for i ∈ K, in p∗i , candidate zi3 must be in positionm−`(m,m′)−`(m,m′−1)+1.
By the maximum partial scores set for z ∈ Z, the element candidates of Z in these q votes must be distinct.
7. By the tightness property, each of the q candidates in X have to score am′ points exactly once. Therefore it
must be true that the element candidates of X in position m− `(m,m′) + 1 in the votes p∗i , for i ∈ K, are
distinct.
8. Therefore, the set {Si|i ∈ K} must form a cover for X ∪ Y ∪ Z.
For the ‘ =⇒ ’ direction, let (X ,Y,Z,S ) be a positive instance. We show that in the PW-DTB instance, (C,V =
P ∪ Q, c), constructed in the reduction, c is, indeed, a possible winner. By hypothesis, there is a S ′ ⊆ S and
|S ′| = q.
1. Complete each vote pi ∈ P to p∗i as follows.
• p∗i =
−→
C ′i  yi2  zi3 
−→
Hm′−1  xi1 
−→
Hm′ if Si ∈ S ′
• p∗i =
−→
C ′i  xi1  yi2 
−→
Hm′−1  zi3 
−→
Hm′ if Si /∈ S ′
Let P ∗ =
⋃l
i=1 p
∗
i .
2. We verify that the candidates have, indeed, scored no more than the respective maximum partial scores in the
completion P ∗ of P . Recall that the position of c is fixed in bothQ and P .
• For all x ∈ X, we have s(P ∗, x) = am′ + (fx − 1)am′−2 + fixedP (x).
• For all y ∈ Y, we have s(P ∗, y) = am′−2 + (fy − 1)am′−1 + fixedP (y).
• For all z ∈ Z, we have s(P ∗, z) = am′−1 + (fz − 1)am′ + fixedP (z).
• For all h ∈ Hm′−1, we have s(P ∗, h) = t(am′−1).
• For all h ∈ Hm′ , we have s(P ∗, h) = t(am′).
• The positions of all the candidates in H ′, as constructed in the reduction, are fixed and therefore their
scores do not change, i.e., for all h′ ∈ H ′, we have s(P ∗, h′) = fixedP (h′)
• By construction, we have s(P ∗, w) < s(P ∗, c).
Therefore, c is a possible winner.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the Lemma 7.
Lemma 8. Let r be a p-valued positional scoring rule, where p ≥ 3, there exists a polynomial g(u) with the property
that for all u, every scoring vector sm of r, with length m = g(u), has m′ = p distinct score values, and if the
three smallest score values are am′−2 > am′−1 > am′ , it holds that m − `(m,m′ − 1) − `(m,m′) ≥ 3u. Then
PW-TTB problem w.r.t. r is NP-complete.
Proof. Observe that p-valued positional scoring rule, where p ≥ 3, is sufficient for the construction in Reduction 4. In
particular, to specify the value µ(c′) for each candidate c′ ∈ C \ {c} we need at least three distinct score values which
we always have.
4.3 Hardness results for PW-BTB
In this section, we prove NP-completeness for the PW-BTB problem w.r.t a restricted group of unbounded rules. We
consider an unbounded rule r with the following properties. There exists a polynomial g(u) with the property that for
all u, every scoring vector sm of r with length m = g(u) has at least three distinct score values, and if the largest three
score values are a1 > a2 > a3 , it holds that m− `(m, 1)− `(m, 2) ≥ 3u. Besides the Borda count, examples include
broad families of scoring rules with scoring vectors in which the fist k score values are distinct. Schematically, such a
scoring vector can be represented as followsa1, . . . , a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,,1)
, a2, . . . , a2︸ ︷︷ ︸
`(m,2)
, a3, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥3u

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Reduction 5. The reduction is similar to Reduction 4. We only provide the key steps below.
• The set of candidates is C = X ∪ Y ∪Z ∪ {c, w} ∪H where X , Y , and Z contains candidates corresponding
to the elements in X ,Y, and Z respectively. These candidates are called element candidates. The set H
contains dummy candidates such that |H| = m− 3q − 2.
• We construct the partial profile P as follows.
– Let the set H be partitioned into H1, H2, and H ′ such that |Hj | = `(m, j) − 1, for j ∈ {1, 2}. H ′ =
H \ (H1 ∪H2). For each Si = (xi1 , yi2 , zi3), let C ′i = C \ ({xi1 , yi2 , zi3} ∪H1 ∪H2) and
−→
C ′i be such
that c  w, i.e., candidate c is always ranked lower than w.
p′i =
−→
H1  xi1  yi2 
−→
H 2  zi3 
−→
C ′i
pi = (H1 ∪ {xi1 , yi2 , zi3} ∪H2) 
−→
C ′i
– P =
l⋃
i=1
pi is a partial profile where each vote is bottom-truncated.
In the vote pi, note that all the candidates except {xi1 , yi2 , zi3} ∪H1 ∪H2 are fixed. In other words,
positions one though `(m, 1) + `(m, 2) + 1 are available.
P ′ =
l⋃
i=1
p′i is a total profile. Moreover, each p
′
i extends pi. Let s(P
′, c) = λP ′ .Observe that s(P ′, w) <
λP ′ since w is in a position greater c in all
−→
C ′i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
• Now we specify the value µ(c′) for each c′ ∈ C \ {c}.
– For all x ∈ X , we have µ(x) = a3 + (fx − 1)a1 + fixedP (x).
– For all y ∈ Y , we have µ(y) = a1 + (fy − 1)a2 + fixedP (y).
– For all z ∈ Z, we have µ(z) = a2 + (fz − 1)a3 + fixedP (z).
– For all h ∈ Hj , we have µ(h) = t(aj) where 1 ≤ j ≤ m′.
– µ(w) ≥ ta1.
The remaining steps are identical to Reduction 4.
Proposition 10. The profile P ∪Q in Reduction 5 has the tightness property.
Proof. The proof of tightness property for the above construction is similar to the proof of Proposition 8.
Lemma 9. Let r be an unbounded rule such that there exists a polynomial g(u) with the property that for all u, every
scoring vector sm of r with length m = g(u) has at least three distinct score values, and if the largest three score
values are a1 > a2 > a3 , it holds that m− `(m, 1)− `(m, 2) ≥ 3u. Then reduction 5 is a polynomial-time reduction
of 3DM to PW-TTB w.r.t. r.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 7.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 9.
Lemma 10. Let r be a p-valued positional scoring rule, where p ≥ 3, such that there exists a polynomial g(u) with the
property that for all u, every scoring vector sm of r with length m = g(u) has p distinct score values, and if the largest
three score values are a1 > a2 > a3 , it holds that m− `(m, 1)− `(m, 2) ≥ 3u. Then the PW-BTB problem w.r.t. r is
NP-complete.
Proof. Observe that p-valued positional scoring rule, where p ≥ 3, is sufficient for the construction in Reduction 5. In
particular, to specify the value µ(c′) for each candidate c′ ∈ C \ {c} we need at least three distinct score values which
we always have.
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4.4 Hardness of PW-DTB w.r.t. unbounded rules
We conclude with the following result for PW-DTB w.r.t. to a broad group of unbounded rules. This generalises
the existing results in Theorem 4. Putting together the hardness results in Lemma 7 and Lemma 9, we can state the
following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let r be an unbounded rule that satisfies one of the following conditions:
1. There exists a polynomial g(u) such that for every u, the scoring vector sm of r with m = g(u) has m′ ≥ 3
distinct score values, and if the three smallest score values are am′−2 > am′−1 > am′ , it holds that
m− `(m,m′ − 1)− `(m,m′) ≥ 3u.
2. There exists a polynomial g(u) such that for every u, the scoring vector sm of r with m = g(u) has at
least three distinct score values, and if the largest three score values are a1 > a2 > a3 , it holds that
m− `(m, 1)− `(m, 2) ≥ 3u.
Then the PW-DTB problem w.r.t. r is NP-complete.
Proof. Since PW-TTB and PW-BTB are special cases of PW-DTB, the NP-hardness results in Lemma 7 and Lemma 9
also hold for PW-DTB.
Therefore, PW-DTB w.r.t. unbounded rules with scoring vectors containing three values such that the length of the
block containing the second score value is unbounded remains open.The complexity of PW-DTB w.r.t. to all p-valued
rules except R(f, l), such that f + 1 > 2, remains to be established.
5 Concluding Remarks
Scoring Rule PW PW-PC PW-PP PW-DTB PW-TTB PW-BTB
Plurality & Veto P P P P P P
2-valued NP-c NP-c P P P P
R(1, 1) NP-c NP-c P P P P
R(f, l), f + l > 2 NP-c NP-c ? ? ? ?
All other 3-valued NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c∗[Lem. 8] NP-c∗[Lem. 10]
p-valued, p ≥ 4 NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c∗[Lem. 8] NP-c∗[Lem. 10]
Unbounded rules NP-c NP-c NP-c NP-c∗[Thm. 5] NP-c∗[Lem. 7] NP-c∗[Lem. 9]
Table 3: Classification of the PW problem and its various restrictions. The results in boldface have been established in
this paper.
∗See the respective results for restrictions.
The contributions in this paper can be summarised as follows.
• We obtained a complete classification of the complexity of the PW problem on partial chains w.r.t. to all
pure positional scoring rules. Since the classification we obtained is the same as that of the PW problem on
arbitrary partial orders, we gave a new, self-contained (and, in our view, more principled) proof of the original
classification theorem for PW.
• We established new NP-completeness results for the PW problem on top-truncated, and bottom-truncated
partial orders. These results also hold for the PW problem on doubly-truncated partial orders.
• Our results, together with their comparison to earlier related results in the literature, are depicted in Table 3.
In terms of future work, it remains an open problem to pinpoint the complexity of the PW problem w.r.t. rules R(f, l)
with f + l > 2 on doubly-truncated partial orders and on partitioned partial orders. In a different direction, there is a rich
body of work on algorithmic problems about manipulation in voting (PW is a special case of one of these problems),
where computational hardness is regarded as a feature because it provides an obstacle to such manipulation (see [19] for
a survey). More recent work in this area includes the study of manipulation in voting when only incomplete preferences,
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expressed as partial orders, are available [20]. Furthermore, top-truncated partial orders have been studied in this setting
[21]. It would be natural to investigate manipulation in voting with partial chains as incomplete preferences.
As a broader agenda, we note that a framework aiming to create bridges between computational social choice and
relational databases was introduced in [22] and studied further in [23]. In that framework, the main concepts are the
necessary answers and the possible answers to queries about winners in elections together with relational context about
candidates, voters, and candidates’ positions on issues. It should be pointed out that the necessary answers to natural
database queries may be intractable (coNP-complete), even w.r.t. the plurality rule. Thus, our work motivates the
investigation of the complexity of the necessary answers and the possible answers to queries on partial chains and other
restricted classes of partial orders.
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